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Recent Decisions
ANTI-TRUST-MLRKET CONCEPT BROADENED-
SECTION 2 OF SHERMAN ACT
The United States government brought a civil suit under section 4 of
the Sherman Act' alleging that the EJ. du Pont de Nemours and Co. had
monopolized and was monopolizing interstate commerce in cellophane
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.2 An injunction was sought
to restrain further monopolization and divestiture was prayed for to dis-
sipate the effect of the monopolization.
The du Pont Co. controls 75% of the manufacture and sales of cello-
phane in the United States. But du Pont's sales represent less than 20%
of the sales of the various flexible packaging materials.
The trial court ruled that du Pont had not monopolized trade m
cellophane3 The United States appealed this ruling directly to the
Supreme Court
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the relevant "market" in
which cellophane sold is that of the flexible packaging materials. In the
opinion of the majority du Pont was considered not to have monopolized
cellophane " when that product has the competition and interchange-
ability with other wrappings. 0,4
As in every case based on section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Court
was forced to consider two questions: (1) What is monopoly power
within the purview of section 2, and (2) how is the presence of this
monopoly power determined?
The American courts are agreed that " a party has -monopoly
power if it has a power of controlling prices or unreasonably Testrict-
ing competition."5 But in order to apply this definition to any given set
of facts, it is necessary for the courts to determine the relevant "market"
which is the subject or object of the alleged offense.
Generally the relevant "market' for any product or service is defined
by the other products or services which compete with it in the applicable
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1952). 'The several district courts of the
United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of sec-
tions 1-7 of this tide. "
226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952). "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several
states shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
'Unted States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del.
1953).
'United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 403 (1956).
5Id. at 389.
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sales area. Divergent opinions, however, have been advanced in the past
as to what type of products do in fact compete with one another. Whether
a defendant is guilty of monopolizing "any part" of interstate trade may
very well depend upon the number of products which the court regards as
a part of the relevant "market."
Prior to 1953 courts defined the relevant "market" stricdy. Used
aluminium was found to be in a market distinct from that in which
virgin aluminum was sold.6 Linen rugs were considered to be in a market
separate from that in which other floor coverings sold.7 One of the most
strict definitions of the "market" was set forth by a circuit court which
found that bus lines in 27 cities constituted the relevant "market" for
gasoline, tires, parts, etc., for the purposes of an alleged section 2 viola-
tion.8
In the case of Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. Umted States,9 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana found that the Times-
Picayune, the only morning newspaper in New Orleans, sold in a "market"
distinct from that in which the two evening papers sold. The courts
which decided the earlier cases would undoubtedly -have found this same
"market" distinction. The Supreme Court, however, over-ruled the trial
judge's finding, and in so doing hinted that a change was coming. The
court found that the Times-Picayune did not sell in a market by itself, but
rather that the relevant "marker" included all three daily newspapers.10
The Court based its finding on the fact that the product being sold
was advertising and that:
nothing in the record suggests that advertisers viewed the city's news-
paper readers as other than fungible customer potential."
The Court concluded that since the "readership" bought by these adver-
tisers was fungible, it would be impossible to find sellers of this product
in different markets.
'United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The
trial court found that the defendant controlled 33% of the relevant "market" as
that court determined it. The circuit court in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand,
ruled that "secondary ingot" or used aluminum was not part of the relevant market.
Absenting used aluminum from Alcoa's market, the figures showed that the de-
fendant controlled 90% of the production and sales of virgin aluminum. On the
basis of this finding Alcoa was found guilty of a violation of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.
"United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
Unitred States v. National City Lines Inc., 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1951).
' 105 F. Supp. 670, 678 (E.D. La. 1952). "The corporatAon is able to enforce the
unit rate only because of the dominant position which the Times-Picayune (the
morning newspaper) occupies in New Orleans. "
"Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
n Id. at 613.
[March
RECENT DECISIONS
The Times-Picayune decision indicated a tendency on the part of the
Court to widen the scope of substitutes which may be included in one
"market." Was the holding of the Times-Picayune case merely the result
of a peculiar fact situation or did this opinion indicate a real trend?
The Supreme Court has answered this question in the du Pont case.
As a general rule to be followed whenever a "market" question arises,
the Court in the instant case announced that:
commodities reasonably snterchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes make up the "part of trade or commerce" monopolization of
which may be illegal." (Emphasis added).
The Court applied this rule of reasonable interchangeability to the
product involved and found that although " cellophane combines the
desirable elements of transparency, strength and cheapness more definitely
than any of the others it has to meet competition from other materials
in every one of its uses."' Inasmuch as one material or another com-
peted with cellophane in each of its uses the Court felt that it was rea-
sonable to include cellophane in the same "market" with all of the flexible
wrapping materials.
Having found that cellophane was merely a part of the large flexible
wrapping material market, the Court ruled that du Pones control of
17.9% of that "markee did not amount to monopolization of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act.
This decision represents a departure from the previous judicial pro-
nouncements concerning the concept of the "market." Carried to its
logical conclusion the rule of reasonable interchangeability could result in
a substantial lessening of convictions under sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act. Several questions previously settled are now open to specula-
tion. For instance, may the owner of theatres in a number of single
theatre towns still be regarded as without competition in these towns?'
4
Are taverns with television sets, dance halls and countless other forms of
public entertainment to be considered as "reasonably interchangeable"
with motion pictures after the da Pont decision? Is not the second hand
"United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
IId. at 398. The Court categorized the other flexible wrapping materials as follows:
"1. Opaque nonmostureproof wrapping paper designed primarily for conven-
ience and protection in handling packages;
2. moistureproof films of varying degrees of transparency designed primarily
either to protect or to display and protect, the products they encompass;
3. nonmoistureproof transparent films designed primarily to display
4. moistureproof materials other than films of varying degrees of transparency.
(foils and paper products)."
"United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
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